Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs
This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of the time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random-sample survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violati...
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| Format: | Article |
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University of Chicago Press
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50060/ |
| _version_ | 1848798142704648192 |
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| author | Guo, Di Jiang, Kun Xu, Chenggang |
| author_facet | Guo, Di Jiang, Kun Xu, Chenggang |
| author_sort | Guo, Di |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of the time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random-sample survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their businesses at a cost to management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the firm is larger or older. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:15:04Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-50060 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:15:04Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | University of Chicago Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-500602020-05-04T19:03:18Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50060/ Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs Guo, Di Jiang, Kun Xu, Chenggang This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of the time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random-sample survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their businesses at a cost to management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the firm is larger or older. University of Chicago Press 2017-09-01 Article PeerReviewed Guo, Di, Jiang, Kun and Xu, Chenggang (2017) Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs. Journal of Human Capital, 11 (3). pp. 397-422. ISSN 1932-8664 institution property rights entrepreneurship time allocation Chinese economy https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/692844 doi:10.1086/692844 doi:10.1086/692844 |
| spellingShingle | institution property rights entrepreneurship time allocation Chinese economy Guo, Di Jiang, Kun Xu, Chenggang Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs |
| title | Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs |
| title_full | Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs |
| title_fullStr | Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs |
| title_short | Institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from Chinese entrepreneurs |
| title_sort | institutions and managerial task allocation: evidence from chinese entrepreneurs |
| topic | institution property rights entrepreneurship time allocation Chinese economy |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50060/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50060/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50060/ |