Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting
This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, nam...
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| Format: | Book Section |
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Springer
2014
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47213/ |
| _version_ | 1848797491548389376 |
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| author | Montero, Maria |
| author_facet | Montero, Maria |
| author_sort | Montero, Maria |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, namely ignoring dummies and vanishing only for dummies. This paper shows that it does not respect dominance either. It is also argued that the equilibrium displays one of the less intuitive instances of the paradox of new members. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:04:43Z |
| format | Book Section |
| id | nottingham-47213 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:04:43Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-472132020-05-04T16:46:29Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47213/ Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting Montero, Maria This paper discusses whether the equilibrium of a popular formal bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989) satisfies the postulates that Felsenthal and Machover (1998) consider essential in any power measure. It is well known that the equilibrium does not satisfy two adequacy postulates, namely ignoring dummies and vanishing only for dummies. This paper shows that it does not respect dominance either. It is also argued that the equilibrium displays one of the less intuitive instances of the paradox of new members. Springer 2014-04-19 Book Section PeerReviewed Montero, Maria (2014) Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting. In: Voting Power and Procedures: Essays in Honour of Dan Felsenthal and Moshé Machover. Studies in choice and welfare . Springer, Berlin, pp. 309-321. ISBN 978-3-319-05157-4 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-05158-1_17 doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1 doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05158-1 |
| spellingShingle | Montero, Maria Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| title | Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| title_full | Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| title_fullStr | Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| title_full_unstemmed | Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| title_short | Postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| title_sort | postulates and paradoxes of voting power in a noncooperative setting |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47213/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47213/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/47213/ |