CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management
This paper explores the relationship between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management base on the arguments given by prior studies that CEOs with equity related pay would like to sell shares in the future, which encourage them to manipulate earnings to increase short-term stock price. I hypot...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/46009/ |
| _version_ | 1848797237978595328 |
|---|---|
| author | Wang, Shunyu |
| author_facet | Wang, Shunyu |
| author_sort | Wang, Shunyu |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper explores the relationship between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management base on the arguments given by prior studies that CEOs with equity related pay would like to sell shares in the future, which encourage them to manipulate earnings to increase short-term stock price. I hypothesize that the CEOs with stock-related pay would more likely to manipulate earnings. To find the relations between earnings management and CEOs’ equity incentives, discretionary accruals are used as proxies for earnings management. Exercisable options, unexercisable options, option grants, restricted stock awards and stock ownership are used to measure CEOs’ equity incentives. Using the data obtained from Compustat database, I finally find that CEOs with equity incentives would more likely to involve in earnings management behaviors. My results are consistent with the document given by prior studies that CEOs’ stock-related pay create opportunistic incentives for them. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:00:42Z |
| format | Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) |
| id | nottingham-46009 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T20:00:42Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-460092018-04-10T15:52:02Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/46009/ CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management Wang, Shunyu This paper explores the relationship between CEOs’ equity incentives and earnings management base on the arguments given by prior studies that CEOs with equity related pay would like to sell shares in the future, which encourage them to manipulate earnings to increase short-term stock price. I hypothesize that the CEOs with stock-related pay would more likely to manipulate earnings. To find the relations between earnings management and CEOs’ equity incentives, discretionary accruals are used as proxies for earnings management. Exercisable options, unexercisable options, option grants, restricted stock awards and stock ownership are used to measure CEOs’ equity incentives. Using the data obtained from Compustat database, I finally find that CEOs with equity incentives would more likely to involve in earnings management behaviors. My results are consistent with the document given by prior studies that CEOs’ stock-related pay create opportunistic incentives for them. 2017-09-13 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/46009/1/%E9%A1%BA%E9%9B%A8%E8%AE%BA%E6%96%87%E7%BB%88%E7%A8%BF.pdf Wang, Shunyu (2017) CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] |
| spellingShingle | Wang, Shunyu CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| title | CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| title_full | CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| title_fullStr | CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| title_full_unstemmed | CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| title_short | CEO’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| title_sort | ceo’s equity incentives and earnings management |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/46009/ |