Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management
This study explores how the board of directors and audit committee affect earnings management by analyzing FTSE 100 companies during 2011-2016. The board independence, the board leadership structure, the board size, and the frequency of board meeting are considered as board characteristics. As shown...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2017
|
| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45735/ |
| _version_ | 1848797183720030208 |
|---|---|
| author | LIU, Tong |
| author_facet | LIU, Tong |
| author_sort | LIU, Tong |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This study explores how the board of directors and audit committee affect earnings management by analyzing FTSE 100 companies during 2011-2016. The board independence, the board leadership structure, the board size, and the frequency of board meeting are considered as board characteristics. As shown in regression results,
the board with a high proportion of independent directors is less likely to involve in earnings management. There is a negative relation between the frequency of board meeting and discretionary accruals in this empirical test. In addition, the larger firm is related to less
earnings management. However, no significant relations are found between the leadership structure and earnings management. As for the audit committee characteristics, the independence, the size, and the degree of activity are investigated. No significant effects of audit
committee characteristics on earnings management are found in this study. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:59:50Z |
| format | Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) |
| id | nottingham-45735 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:59:50Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-457352018-04-10T15:34:54Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45735/ Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management LIU, Tong This study explores how the board of directors and audit committee affect earnings management by analyzing FTSE 100 companies during 2011-2016. The board independence, the board leadership structure, the board size, and the frequency of board meeting are considered as board characteristics. As shown in regression results, the board with a high proportion of independent directors is less likely to involve in earnings management. There is a negative relation between the frequency of board meeting and discretionary accruals in this empirical test. In addition, the larger firm is related to less earnings management. However, no significant relations are found between the leadership structure and earnings management. As for the audit committee characteristics, the independence, the size, and the degree of activity are investigated. No significant effects of audit committee characteristics on earnings management are found in this study. 2017-09-11 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45735/1/lunwen.pdf LIU, Tong (2017) Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] |
| spellingShingle | LIU, Tong Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management |
| title | Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management |
| title_full | Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management |
| title_fullStr | Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management |
| title_full_unstemmed | Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management |
| title_short | Board of Directors, Audit Committee, and Earnings Management |
| title_sort | board of directors, audit committee, and earnings management |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45735/ |