Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing?
We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus / avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments subjects only learn the success of...
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45397/ |
| _version_ | 1848797122958196736 |
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| author | De Quidt, Jonathan Fallucchi, Francesco Kölle, Felix Nosenzo, Daniele Quercia, Simone |
| author_facet | De Quidt, Jonathan Fallucchi, Francesco Kölle, Felix Nosenzo, Daniele Quercia, Simone |
| author_sort | De Quidt, Jonathan |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus / avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:58:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-45397 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:58:52Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-453972020-05-04T19:24:14Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45397/ Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? De Quidt, Jonathan Fallucchi, Francesco Kölle, Felix Nosenzo, Daniele Quercia, Simone We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus / avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task. We fail to observe a contract framing effect in either condition: effort provision is statistically indistinguishable under bonus and penalty contracts. Springer 2017-12-30 Article PeerReviewed De Quidt, Jonathan, Fallucchi, Francesco, Kölle, Felix, Nosenzo, Daniele and Quercia, Simone (2017) Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? Journal of the Economic Science Association, 3 (2). pp. 174-182. ISSN 2199-6776 contract framing; bonus; penalty; fine; loss aversion https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9 doi:10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9 doi:10.1007/s40881-017-0039-9 |
| spellingShingle | contract framing; bonus; penalty; fine; loss aversion De Quidt, Jonathan Fallucchi, Francesco Kölle, Felix Nosenzo, Daniele Quercia, Simone Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| title | Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| title_full | Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| title_fullStr | Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| title_short | Bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| title_sort | bonus versus penalty: how robust are the effects of contract framing? |
| topic | contract framing; bonus; penalty; fine; loss aversion |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45397/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45397/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/45397/ |