Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization
This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalit...
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| Format: | Article |
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NOW Publishers
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44275/ |
| _version_ | 1848796878372601856 |
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| author | Montero, Maria |
| author_facet | Montero, Maria |
| author_sort | Montero, Maria |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:54:59Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-44275 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:54:59Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | NOW Publishers |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-442752020-05-04T19:14:04Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44275/ Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization Montero, Maria This paper examines the relationship between voting weights and expected equilibrium payoffs in legislative bargaining and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for payoffs to be proportional to weights. This condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the supply and demand for coalition partners. An implication of this condition is that Snyder et al.'s (2005) result, that payoffs are proportional to weights in large replicated games, does not necessarily extend to the smaller games that arise in applications. Departures from proportionality may be substantial and may arise even in well-behaved (homogeneous) games. NOW Publishers 2017-10-24 Article PeerReviewed Montero, Maria (2017) Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 12 (3). pp. 325-346. ISSN 1554-0634 legislative bargaining weighted voting proportional payoffs http://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-16019 doi:10.1561/100.00016019 doi:10.1561/100.00016019 |
| spellingShingle | legislative bargaining weighted voting proportional payoffs Montero, Maria Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| title | Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| title_full | Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| title_fullStr | Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| title_full_unstemmed | Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| title_short | Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| title_sort | proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization |
| topic | legislative bargaining weighted voting proportional payoffs |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44275/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44275/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/44275/ |