Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream market for inputs. We find that when an input pricing contract is determined through centralised bargaining, the final goods producers earn higher (lower) profit under quantity competition than under pri...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43971/ |
| _version_ | 1848796808331919360 |
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| author | Basak, Debasmita |
| author_facet | Basak, Debasmita |
| author_sort | Basak, Debasmita |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream market for inputs. We find that when an input pricing contract is determined through centralised bargaining, the final goods producers earn higher (lower) profit under quantity competition than under price competition if the goods are substitutes (complements). Our results are strikingly different to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in other vertical pricing models. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:53:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-43971 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:53:52Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-439712018-09-02T04:30:10Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43971/ Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining Basak, Debasmita We revisit the debate on Cournot and Bertrand profit comparison in a vertically related upstream market for inputs. We find that when an input pricing contract is determined through centralised bargaining, the final goods producers earn higher (lower) profit under quantity competition than under price competition if the goods are substitutes (complements). Our results are strikingly different to the ones obtained from a similar comparison in other vertical pricing models. Elsevier 2017-05-31 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en cc_by_nc_nd https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43971/1/economics%20letters.%20Basak.pdf Basak, Debasmita (2017) Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining. Economics Letters, 154 . pp. 124-127. ISSN 0165-1765 Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Centralised bargaining; Vertical pricing; Welfare https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.031 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.031 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.031 |
| spellingShingle | Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Centralised bargaining; Vertical pricing; Welfare Basak, Debasmita Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| title | Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| title_full | Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| title_fullStr | Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| title_short | Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| title_sort | cournot vs. bertrand under centralised bargaining |
| topic | Bargaining; Bertrand; Cournot; Centralised bargaining; Vertical pricing; Welfare |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43971/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43971/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43971/ |