Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers' strateg...
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer
2018
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43782/ |
| _version_ | 1848796767223545856 |
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| author | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_facet | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_sort | Possajennikov, Alex |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers' strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders' strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:53:13Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-43782 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:53:13Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-437822020-05-04T19:51:39Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43782/ Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment Possajennikov, Alex Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders' types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers' strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders' strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game. Springer 2018-05 Article PeerReviewed Possajennikov, Alex (2018) Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment. Theory and Decision, 84 (3). pp. 483-505. ISSN 1573-7187 Beliefs Signaling Experiment Learning Belief elicitation https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-017-9614-z doi:10.1007/s11238-017-9614-z doi:10.1007/s11238-017-9614-z |
| spellingShingle | Beliefs Signaling Experiment Learning Belief elicitation Possajennikov, Alex Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| title | Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| title_full | Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| title_fullStr | Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| title_full_unstemmed | Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| title_short | Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| title_sort | belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment |
| topic | Beliefs Signaling Experiment Learning Belief elicitation |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43782/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43782/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/43782/ |