Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests
In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's...
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| Format: | Book Section |
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Springer
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41786/ |
| _version_ | 1848796354107670528 |
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| author | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author2 | Buchholz, Wolfgang |
| author_facet | Buchholz, Wolfgang Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_sort | Possajennikov, Alex |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:46:39Z |
| format | Book Section |
| id | nottingham-41786 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:46:39Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-417862020-05-04T18:38:29Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41786/ Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests Possajennikov, Alex In a semi-aggregative representation of a game, the payoff of a player depends on a player's own strategy and on a personalized aggregate of all players' strategies. Suppose that each player has a conjecture about the reaction of the personalized aggregate to a change in the player's own strategy. The players play an equilibrium given their conjectures, and evolution selects conjectures that lead to a higher payoff in such an equilibrium. Considering one player role, I show that for any conjectures of the other players, only conjectures that are consistent can be evolutionarily stable, where consistency means that the conjecture is, to a first approximation, correct at equilibrium. I illustrate this result in public good games and contests. Springer Buchholz, Wolfgang Ruebbelke, Dirk 2017-03-20 Book Section NonPeerReviewed Possajennikov, Alex (2017) Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests. In: The theory of externalities and public goods: essays in memory of Richard C. Cornes. Springer, pp. 85-105. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-49442-5_5 |
| spellingShingle | Possajennikov, Alex Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| title | Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| title_full | Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| title_fullStr | Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| title_short | Evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| title_sort | evolution of consistent conjectures in semi-aggregative representation of games, with applications to public good games and contests |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41786/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41786/ |