Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012)

Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012)

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand an...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Bouwmeester, Samantha, Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L., Aczel, Balazs, Barbosa, Fernando, Bègue, Laurent, Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Chmura, Thorsten, Cornelissen, Gert, Døssing, Felix S., Espín, Antonio M., Evans, Anthony M., Ferreira-Santos, Fernando, Fiedler, Susann, Flegr, Jaroslav, Ghaffari, Minou, Glöckner, Andreas, Goeschl, Timo, Guo, Lisa, Hauser, Oliver P., Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto, Herrero, Anthony, Horne, Zachary, Houdek, Petr, Johannesson, Magnus, Koppel, Lina, Kujal, Praveen, Laine, Tei, Lohse, Johannes, Martins, Eva C., Mauro, Carlos, Mischkowski, Dorothee, Mukherjee, Sumitava, Myrseth, Kristian Ove, Navarro-Martinez, Daniel, Neal, Tess M.S., Novakova, Julie, Pagà, Roger, Paiva, Tiago O., Palfi, Bence, Piovesan, Marco, Rahal, Rima-Maria, Salomon, Erika, Srinivasan, Narayanan, Srivastava, Ajita, Szaszi, Barnabas, Szollosi, Aba, Thor, Karoline Ø., Tinghög, Gustav, Trueblood, Jennifer S., Van Bavel, J. Jay, van ‘t Veer, Anna E., Västfjäll, Daniel, Warner, Megan, Wengström, Erik, Wills, Julian, Wollbrant, Conny E.
Format: Article
Published: Sage 2017
Subjects:
Cooperation
Social heuristic hypothesis
Decision making
Economic games
Social psychology
Replication
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41615/

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