Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012)
In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand an...
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| Format: | Article |
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Sage
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41615/ |
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| author | Bouwmeester, Samantha Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L. Aczel, Balazs Barbosa, Fernando Bègue, Laurent Brañas-Garza, Pablo Chmura, Thorsten Cornelissen, Gert Døssing, Felix S. Espín, Antonio M. Evans, Anthony M. Ferreira-Santos, Fernando Fiedler, Susann Flegr, Jaroslav Ghaffari, Minou Glöckner, Andreas Goeschl, Timo Guo, Lisa Hauser, Oliver P. Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto Herrero, Anthony Horne, Zachary Houdek, Petr Johannesson, Magnus Koppel, Lina Kujal, Praveen Laine, Tei Lohse, Johannes Martins, Eva C. Mauro, Carlos Mischkowski, Dorothee Mukherjee, Sumitava Myrseth, Kristian Ove Navarro-Martinez, Daniel Neal, Tess M.S. Novakova, Julie Pagà, Roger Paiva, Tiago O. Palfi, Bence Piovesan, Marco Rahal, Rima-Maria Salomon, Erika Srinivasan, Narayanan Srivastava, Ajita Szaszi, Barnabas Szollosi, Aba Thor, Karoline Ø. Tinghög, Gustav Trueblood, Jennifer S. Van Bavel, J. Jay van ‘t Veer, Anna E. Västfjäll, Daniel Warner, Megan Wengström, Erik Wills, Julian Wollbrant, Conny E. |
| author_facet | Bouwmeester, Samantha Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L. Aczel, Balazs Barbosa, Fernando Bègue, Laurent Brañas-Garza, Pablo Chmura, Thorsten Cornelissen, Gert Døssing, Felix S. Espín, Antonio M. Evans, Anthony M. Ferreira-Santos, Fernando Fiedler, Susann Flegr, Jaroslav Ghaffari, Minou Glöckner, Andreas Goeschl, Timo Guo, Lisa Hauser, Oliver P. Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto Herrero, Anthony Horne, Zachary Houdek, Petr Johannesson, Magnus Koppel, Lina Kujal, Praveen Laine, Tei Lohse, Johannes Martins, Eva C. Mauro, Carlos Mischkowski, Dorothee Mukherjee, Sumitava Myrseth, Kristian Ove Navarro-Martinez, Daniel Neal, Tess M.S. Novakova, Julie Pagà, Roger Paiva, Tiago O. Palfi, Bence Piovesan, Marco Rahal, Rima-Maria Salomon, Erika Srinivasan, Narayanan Srivastava, Ajita Szaszi, Barnabas Szollosi, Aba Thor, Karoline Ø. Tinghög, Gustav Trueblood, Jennifer S. Van Bavel, J. Jay van ‘t Veer, Anna E. Västfjäll, Daniel Warner, Megan Wengström, Erik Wills, Julian Wollbrant, Conny E. |
| author_sort | Bouwmeester, Samantha |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:46:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-41615 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:46:02Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Sage |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-416152020-05-04T18:32:11Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41615/ Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) Bouwmeester, Samantha Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L. Aczel, Balazs Barbosa, Fernando Bègue, Laurent Brañas-Garza, Pablo Chmura, Thorsten Cornelissen, Gert Døssing, Felix S. Espín, Antonio M. Evans, Anthony M. Ferreira-Santos, Fernando Fiedler, Susann Flegr, Jaroslav Ghaffari, Minou Glöckner, Andreas Goeschl, Timo Guo, Lisa Hauser, Oliver P. Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto Herrero, Anthony Horne, Zachary Houdek, Petr Johannesson, Magnus Koppel, Lina Kujal, Praveen Laine, Tei Lohse, Johannes Martins, Eva C. Mauro, Carlos Mischkowski, Dorothee Mukherjee, Sumitava Myrseth, Kristian Ove Navarro-Martinez, Daniel Neal, Tess M.S. Novakova, Julie Pagà, Roger Paiva, Tiago O. Palfi, Bence Piovesan, Marco Rahal, Rima-Maria Salomon, Erika Srinivasan, Narayanan Srivastava, Ajita Szaszi, Barnabas Szollosi, Aba Thor, Karoline Ø. Tinghög, Gustav Trueblood, Jennifer S. Van Bavel, J. Jay van ‘t Veer, Anna E. Västfjäll, Daniel Warner, Megan Wengström, Erik Wills, Julian Wollbrant, Conny E. In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation. Sage 2017-03-01 Article PeerReviewed Bouwmeester, Samantha, Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L., Aczel, Balazs, Barbosa, Fernando, Bègue, Laurent, Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Chmura, Thorsten, Cornelissen, Gert, Døssing, Felix S., Espín, Antonio M., Evans, Anthony M., Ferreira-Santos, Fernando, Fiedler, Susann, Flegr, Jaroslav, Ghaffari, Minou, Glöckner, Andreas, Goeschl, Timo, Guo, Lisa, Hauser, Oliver P., Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto, Herrero, Anthony, Horne, Zachary, Houdek, Petr, Johannesson, Magnus, Koppel, Lina, Kujal, Praveen, Laine, Tei, Lohse, Johannes, Martins, Eva C., Mauro, Carlos, Mischkowski, Dorothee, Mukherjee, Sumitava, Myrseth, Kristian Ove, Navarro-Martinez, Daniel, Neal, Tess M.S., Novakova, Julie, Pagà, Roger, Paiva, Tiago O., Palfi, Bence, Piovesan, Marco, Rahal, Rima-Maria, Salomon, Erika, Srinivasan, Narayanan, Srivastava, Ajita, Szaszi, Barnabas, Szollosi, Aba, Thor, Karoline Ø., Tinghög, Gustav, Trueblood, Jennifer S., Van Bavel, J. Jay, van ‘t Veer, Anna E., Västfjäll, Daniel, Warner, Megan, Wengström, Erik, Wills, Julian and Wollbrant, Conny E. (2017) Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science . ISSN 1745-6924 Cooperation Social heuristic hypothesis Decision making Economic games Social psychology Replication http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1745691617693624 doi:10.1177/1745691617693624 doi:10.1177/1745691617693624 |
| spellingShingle | Cooperation Social heuristic hypothesis Decision making Economic games Social psychology Replication Bouwmeester, Samantha Verkoeijen, Peter P.J.L. Aczel, Balazs Barbosa, Fernando Bègue, Laurent Brañas-Garza, Pablo Chmura, Thorsten Cornelissen, Gert Døssing, Felix S. Espín, Antonio M. Evans, Anthony M. Ferreira-Santos, Fernando Fiedler, Susann Flegr, Jaroslav Ghaffari, Minou Glöckner, Andreas Goeschl, Timo Guo, Lisa Hauser, Oliver P. Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto Herrero, Anthony Horne, Zachary Houdek, Petr Johannesson, Magnus Koppel, Lina Kujal, Praveen Laine, Tei Lohse, Johannes Martins, Eva C. Mauro, Carlos Mischkowski, Dorothee Mukherjee, Sumitava Myrseth, Kristian Ove Navarro-Martinez, Daniel Neal, Tess M.S. Novakova, Julie Pagà, Roger Paiva, Tiago O. Palfi, Bence Piovesan, Marco Rahal, Rima-Maria Salomon, Erika Srinivasan, Narayanan Srivastava, Ajita Szaszi, Barnabas Szollosi, Aba Thor, Karoline Ø. Tinghög, Gustav Trueblood, Jennifer S. Van Bavel, J. Jay van ‘t Veer, Anna E. Västfjäll, Daniel Warner, Megan Wengström, Erik Wills, Julian Wollbrant, Conny E. Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) |
| title | Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) |
| title_full | Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) |
| title_fullStr | Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) |
| title_short | Registered replication report: Rand, Greene & Nowak (2012) |
| title_sort | registered replication report: rand, greene & nowak (2012) |
| topic | Cooperation Social heuristic hypothesis Decision making Economic games Social psychology Replication |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41615/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41615/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/41615/ |