Delayed response in the Hawk Dove Game
We consider a group of agents playing the Hawk-Dove game. These agents have a finite memory of past interactions which they use to optimize their play. By both analytical and numerical approaches, we show that an instability occurs at a critical memory length, and we provide its characterization. We...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer Verlag
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/40436/ |
| Summary: | We consider a group of agents playing the Hawk-Dove game. These agents have a finite memory of past interactions which they use to optimize their play. By both analytical and numerical approaches, we show that an instability occurs at a critical memory length, and we provide its characterization. We show also that when the game is stable, having a long memory is beneficial but that instability, which may be produced by excessively long memory, hands the advantage to those with shorter memories. |
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