Belief and bounded rationality
Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the principle of charity or Dennett's intentional stance, have proved popular recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as perfectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate. I argue that su...
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| Format: | Article |
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2006
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/395/ |
| _version_ | 1848790407299727360 |
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| author | Jago, Mark |
| author_facet | Jago, Mark |
| author_sort | Jago, Mark |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the principle of charity or Dennett's intentional stance, have proved popular recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as perfectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate. I argue that such downwards revision is no easy task and that several proposed accounts are not satisfactory. I propose a way of characterising agent's belief states which shares Dennett's approach but avoids treating agents as perfectly rational, and develop a formal account in terms of fan models. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:12:07Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-395 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:12:07Z |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-3952020-05-04T20:29:32Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/395/ Belief and bounded rationality Jago, Mark Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the principle of charity or Dennett's intentional stance, have proved popular recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as perfectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate. I argue that such downwards revision is no easy task and that several proposed accounts are not satisfactory. I propose a way of characterising agent's belief states which shares Dennett's approach but avoids treating agents as perfectly rational, and develop a formal account in terms of fan models. 2006-04 Article NonPeerReviewed Jago, Mark (2006) Belief and bounded rationality. Belief states belief ascription intentional stance bounded rationality epistmeic logic resource bounded agents |
| spellingShingle | Belief states belief ascription intentional stance bounded rationality epistmeic logic resource bounded agents Jago, Mark Belief and bounded rationality |
| title | Belief and bounded rationality |
| title_full | Belief and bounded rationality |
| title_fullStr | Belief and bounded rationality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Belief and bounded rationality |
| title_short | Belief and bounded rationality |
| title_sort | belief and bounded rationality |
| topic | Belief states belief ascription intentional stance bounded rationality epistmeic logic resource bounded agents |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/395/ |