Propositions as truthmaker conditions
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmak...
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| Format: | Article |
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Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39186/ |
| _version_ | 1848795782999703552 |
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| author | Jago, Mark |
| author_facet | Jago, Mark |
| author_sort | Jago, Mark |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:37:34Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-39186 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:37:34Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-391862020-05-04T18:21:01Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39186/ Propositions as truthmaker conditions Jago, Mark Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness. Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy 2016-11-15 Article PeerReviewed Jago, Mark (2016) Propositions as truthmaker conditions. Argumenta . ISSN 2465-2334 (In Press) |
| spellingShingle | Jago, Mark Propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| title | Propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| title_full | Propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| title_fullStr | Propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| title_short | Propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| title_sort | propositions as truthmaker conditions |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39186/ |