The invalidity of the argument from illusion
The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
University of Illinois Press
2018
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39127/ |
| _version_ | 1848795769416450048 |
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| author | French, Craig Walters, Lee |
| author_facet | French, Craig Walters, Lee |
| author_sort | French, Craig |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:37:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-39127 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:37:21Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | University of Illinois Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-391272020-05-04T18:18:09Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39127/ The invalidity of the argument from illusion French, Craig Walters, Lee The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged. University of Illinois Press 2018-10-01 Article PeerReviewed French, Craig and Walters, Lee (2018) The invalidity of the argument from illusion. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (4). pp. 357-364. ISSN 2152-1123 https://apq.press.uillinois.edu/55/4/french.html |
| spellingShingle | French, Craig Walters, Lee The invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| title | The invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| title_full | The invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| title_fullStr | The invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | The invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| title_short | The invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| title_sort | invalidity of the argument from illusion |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39127/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39127/ |