Information asymmetries in the hiring process and the risk of new leader dismissal: insights from English premier league soccer organizations
Why are some new leaders dismissed quicker than others? Adopting agency theory logic we examine how different succession contexts shape boards’ information asymmetries about a potential candidate’s competencies in the hiring process, which influences the propensity of making poor hiring decisions an...
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley
2018
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39090/ |
| Summary: | Why are some new leaders dismissed quicker than others? Adopting agency theory logic we examine how different succession contexts shape boards’ information asymmetries about a potential candidate’s competencies in the hiring process, which influences the propensity of making poor hiring decisions and hence the risk of new leader dismissal. Employing duration analysis on a sample of 164 newly appointed leaders in the English premier league (1996 –2014), we find that the risk of new leader dismissal is: (i) greater when the predecessor leader’s exit was initiated by them rather than by the board; (ii) greater when following a longer tenured predecessor; and (iii) lower for outside successions as compared to inside successions. |
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