Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar
Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, f...
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39078/ |
| _version_ | 1848795758783889408 |
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| author | Jago, Mark |
| author_facet | Jago, Mark |
| author_sort | Jago, Mark |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances.
Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of us who aim to find a solution without logical revisionism. As it stands, however, the approach is unsuccessful, as I shall demonstrate below. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:37:11Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-39078 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:37:11Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-390782020-05-04T20:02:07Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39078/ Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar Jago, Mark Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances. Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of us who aim to find a solution without logical revisionism. As it stands, however, the approach is unsuccessful, as I shall demonstrate below. Oxford University Press 2016-07 Article PeerReviewed Jago, Mark (2016) Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar. Analysis, 76 (3). pp. 278-283. ISSN 1467-8284 http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/76/3/278 doi:10.1093/analys/anw033 doi:10.1093/analys/anw033 |
| spellingShingle | Jago, Mark Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar |
| title | Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar |
| title_full | Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar |
| title_fullStr | Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar |
| title_full_unstemmed | Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar |
| title_short | Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar |
| title_sort | alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the liar |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39078/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39078/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39078/ |