Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar

Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, f...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jago, Mark
Format: Article
Published: Oxford University Press 2016
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/39078/
Description
Summary:Stephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties (truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances. Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of us who aim to find a solution without logical revisionism. As it stands, however, the approach is unsuccessful, as I shall demonstrate below.