Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs

This paper examines year-on-year changes to the composition of performance peer groups used for Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in setting CEO pay in FTSE 100 companies and finds evidence of peer selection bias. We find that firms keep their peer groups weak by excluding relatively stronger pe...

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Main Authors: Skovoroda, Rodion, Bruce, Alistair
Format: Article
Published: Wiley 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/38471/
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author Skovoroda, Rodion
Bruce, Alistair
author_facet Skovoroda, Rodion
Bruce, Alistair
author_sort Skovoroda, Rodion
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description This paper examines year-on-year changes to the composition of performance peer groups used for Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in setting CEO pay in FTSE 100 companies and finds evidence of peer selection bias. We find that firms keep their peer groups weak by excluding relatively stronger performing peers. We also show that peer selection bias is less pronounced in firms with higher institutional investor ownership, which suggests that institutional investors might be aware of the risks of peer selection bias. The results suggest that peer group modifications can be viewed, at least in part, as an expression of managerial rent-seeking.
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spelling nottingham-384712020-05-04T19:58:11Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/38471/ Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs Skovoroda, Rodion Bruce, Alistair This paper examines year-on-year changes to the composition of performance peer groups used for Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in setting CEO pay in FTSE 100 companies and finds evidence of peer selection bias. We find that firms keep their peer groups weak by excluding relatively stronger performing peers. We also show that peer selection bias is less pronounced in firms with higher institutional investor ownership, which suggests that institutional investors might be aware of the risks of peer selection bias. The results suggest that peer group modifications can be viewed, at least in part, as an expression of managerial rent-seeking. Wiley 2017-04 Article PeerReviewed Skovoroda, Rodion and Bruce, Alistair (2017) Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs. British Journal of Management, 28 (2). pp. 265-279. ISSN 1467-8551 Corporate Governance Executive Compensation Performance Peer Groups http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8551.12209/abstract doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12209 doi:10.1111/1467-8551.12209
spellingShingle Corporate Governance
Executive Compensation
Performance Peer Groups
Skovoroda, Rodion
Bruce, Alistair
Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs
title Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs
title_full Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs
title_fullStr Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs
title_full_unstemmed Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs
title_short Shifting the goalposts? Analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of FTSE100 CEOs
title_sort shifting the goalposts? analysing changes to performance peer groups used to determine the remuneration of ftse100 ceos
topic Corporate Governance
Executive Compensation
Performance Peer Groups
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/38471/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/38471/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/38471/