Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament

Parliamentary representation is a fluid concept. Yet, while the behaviour of elected representatives during roll call votes has been widely analysed, we know little about how parliamentarians act when their individual voting choices are not made public. This paper explores the relationship between v...

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Main Author: Trumm, Siim
Format: Article
Published: Wiley 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36993/
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author Trumm, Siim
author_facet Trumm, Siim
author_sort Trumm, Siim
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Parliamentary representation is a fluid concept. Yet, while the behaviour of elected representatives during roll call votes has been widely analysed, we know little about how parliamentarians act when their individual voting choices are not made public. This paper explores the relationship between voting procedures and the likelihood that Members of the European Parliament prioritise the interests of their EP party group versus the interests of their national party. Using an original survey, I find that MEPs are more likely to prioritise the interests of their national party over those of their EP party group when voting by show of hands or electronically, as opposed to by roll call. Moreover, this voting procedure effect is particularly salient among MEPs elected from 2004/07 accession countries.
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spelling nottingham-369932020-05-04T20:07:38Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36993/ Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament Trumm, Siim Parliamentary representation is a fluid concept. Yet, while the behaviour of elected representatives during roll call votes has been widely analysed, we know little about how parliamentarians act when their individual voting choices are not made public. This paper explores the relationship between voting procedures and the likelihood that Members of the European Parliament prioritise the interests of their EP party group versus the interests of their national party. Using an original survey, I find that MEPs are more likely to prioritise the interests of their national party over those of their EP party group when voting by show of hands or electronically, as opposed to by roll call. Moreover, this voting procedure effect is particularly salient among MEPs elected from 2004/07 accession countries. Wiley 2015-09 Article PeerReviewed Trumm, Siim (2015) Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (5). pp. 1126-1142. ISSN 1468-5965 voting procedures representation European Parliament voting behaviour http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.12237/abstract doi:10.1111/jcms.12237 doi:10.1111/jcms.12237
spellingShingle voting procedures
representation
European Parliament
voting behaviour
Trumm, Siim
Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament
title Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament
title_full Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament
title_fullStr Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament
title_full_unstemmed Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament
title_short Voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the European Parliament
title_sort voting procedures and parliamentary representation in the european parliament
topic voting procedures
representation
European Parliament
voting behaviour
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36993/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36993/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/36993/