Explanatory abstractions

A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence...

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Main Authors: Jansson, Lina, Juha, Saatsi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2019
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35901/
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author Jansson, Lina
Juha, Saatsi
author_facet Jansson, Lina
Juha, Saatsi
author_sort Jansson, Lina
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent account of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from microphysical and causal nomogical details. To this end, we distinguish different senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations.
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spelling nottingham-359012019-09-12T09:54:50Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35901/ Explanatory abstractions Jansson, Lina Juha, Saatsi A number of philosophers have recently suggested that some abstract, plausibly non-causal and/or mathematical, explanations explain in a way that is radically different from the way causal explanation explain. Namely, while causal explanations explain by providing information about causal dependence, allegedly some abstract explanations explain in a way tied to the independence of the explanandum from the microdetails, or causal laws, for example. We oppose this recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui generis way, and argue that a prominent account of causal explanation can be naturally extended to capture explanations that radically abstract away from microphysical and causal nomogical details. To this end, we distinguish different senses in which an explanation can be more or less abstract, and analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations. Oxford University Press 2019-09 Article PeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35901/1/Explanatory_abstractions_August__18_2016.pdf Jansson, Lina and Juha, Saatsi (2019) Explanatory abstractions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70 (3). ISSN 1464-3537 https://academic.oup.com/bjps/article/70/3/817/4682638
spellingShingle Jansson, Lina
Juha, Saatsi
Explanatory abstractions
title Explanatory abstractions
title_full Explanatory abstractions
title_fullStr Explanatory abstractions
title_full_unstemmed Explanatory abstractions
title_short Explanatory abstractions
title_sort explanatory abstractions
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35901/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35901/