Two-boxing is irrational

Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have com...

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Main Author: Noonan, Harold
Format: Article
Published: Springer 2015
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Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35739/
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author Noonan, Harold
author_facet Noonan, Harold
author_sort Noonan, Harold
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have come to think that you will two-box (whereas there is such an aim by reference to which you can justify one-boxing). The only aim by which the agent in the Newcomb situation can justify his two-boxing is the subjunctively described aim of ‘getting more than I would if I were to one-box’. But such a subjunctively described aim can justify an action only if it can be seen as generating, in conjunction with the agent’s beliefs, an indicatively describable aim which justifies the action. In the case of the Newcomb agent the aim of 'getting more than I would if I were to one-box’ cannot be seen in this way.
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spelling nottingham-357392020-05-04T17:02:14Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35739/ Two-boxing is irrational Noonan, Harold Philosophers debate whether one-boxing or two-boxing is the rational act in a Newcomb situation. I shall argue that one-boxing is the only rational choice. This is so because there is no intelligible aim by reference to which you can justify the choice of two-boxing over one-boxing once you have come to think that you will two-box (whereas there is such an aim by reference to which you can justify one-boxing). The only aim by which the agent in the Newcomb situation can justify his two-boxing is the subjunctively described aim of ‘getting more than I would if I were to one-box’. But such a subjunctively described aim can justify an action only if it can be seen as generating, in conjunction with the agent’s beliefs, an indicatively describable aim which justifies the action. In the case of the Newcomb agent the aim of 'getting more than I would if I were to one-box’ cannot be seen in this way. Springer 2015-02-22 Article PeerReviewed Noonan, Harold (2015) Two-boxing is irrational. Philosophia, 43 (2). pp. 455-462. ISSN 1574-9274 Newcomb Two-boxing Decision theory http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-015-9589-3 doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9589-3 doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9589-3
spellingShingle Newcomb
Two-boxing
Decision theory
Noonan, Harold
Two-boxing is irrational
title Two-boxing is irrational
title_full Two-boxing is irrational
title_fullStr Two-boxing is irrational
title_full_unstemmed Two-boxing is irrational
title_short Two-boxing is irrational
title_sort two-boxing is irrational
topic Newcomb
Two-boxing
Decision theory
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35739/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35739/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35739/