Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism
Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does,...
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press
2014
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34975/ |
| _version_ | 1848794974348378112 |
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| author | Mackie, Penelope |
| author_facet | Mackie, Penelope |
| author_sort | Mackie, Penelope |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:24:43Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-34975 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:24:43Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-349752020-05-04T20:13:13Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34975/ Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism Mackie, Penelope Mumford and Anjum (2014) present a new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism. Although their argument depends on the assumption that free will is, or is the exercise of, a causal power, it does not appeal to any special features of this power. Their new argument does, however, depend upon a general thesis of the incompatibility of causal powers with causal determinism. I argue that Mumford and Anjum have provided no justification for this general thesis. As a consequence, their new argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism is unsuccessful. Oxford University Press 2014-10 Article PeerReviewed Mackie, Penelope (2014) Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism. Analysis, 74 (4). pp. 593-603. ISSN 1467-8284 free will causal powers compatibilism determinism causation http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/593 doi:10.1093/analys/anu088 doi:10.1093/analys/anu088 |
| spellingShingle | free will causal powers compatibilism determinism causation Mackie, Penelope Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| title | Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| title_full | Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| title_fullStr | Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| title_short | Mumford and Anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| title_sort | mumford and anjum on incompatibilism, powers and determinism |
| topic | free will causal powers compatibilism determinism causation |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34975/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34975/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34975/ |