Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”

Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds...

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Main Author: Jansson, Lina
Format: Article
Published: Elsevier 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34899/
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author Jansson, Lina
author_facet Jansson, Lina
author_sort Jansson, Lina
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds setting. In particular, Wallace argues that a rational agent has to assign probabilities in accordance with the Born rule. This argument relies on a rationality constraint that Wallace calls state supervenience. I argue that state supervenience is not defensible as a rationality constraint for Everettian agents unless we already invoke probabilistic notions.
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spelling nottingham-348992020-05-04T17:38:11Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34899/ Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience” Jansson, Lina Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds setting. In particular, Wallace argues that a rational agent has to assign probabilities in accordance with the Born rule. This argument relies on a rationality constraint that Wallace calls state supervenience. I argue that state supervenience is not defensible as a rationality constraint for Everettian agents unless we already invoke probabilistic notions. Elsevier 2016-02-03 Article PeerReviewed Jansson, Lina (2016) Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 53 . pp. 45-53. ISSN 1355-2198 Everettian Quantum Theory Chance Decision Theory State Supervenience http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S135521981530037X doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.12.002 doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.12.002
spellingShingle Everettian Quantum Theory
Chance
Decision Theory State Supervenience
Jansson, Lina
Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
title Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
title_full Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
title_fullStr Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
title_full_unstemmed Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
title_short Everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: Against the principle of “State Supervenience”
title_sort everettian quantum mechanics and physical probability: against the principle of “state supervenience”
topic Everettian Quantum Theory
Chance
Decision Theory State Supervenience
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34899/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34899/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34899/