Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement
When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for...
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| Format: | Article |
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University of Chicago Press
2014
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34880/ |
| _version_ | 1848794953118908416 |
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| author | Jansson, Lina |
| author_facet | Jansson, Lina |
| author_sort | Jansson, Lina |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the central motivations for causal accounts of explanation, namely, the causal account of the directionality of scientific explanation. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:24:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-34880 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:24:23Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | University of Chicago Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-348802020-05-04T16:48:40Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34880/ Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement Jansson, Lina When evaluating the success of causal theories of explanation the focus has typically been on the legitimacy of causal relations and on putative examples of explanations that we cannot capture in causal terms. Here I motivate the existence of a third kind of problem: the difficulty of accounting for explanatory disputes. Moreover, I argue that this problem remains even if the first two are settled and that it threatens to undercut one of the central motivations for causal accounts of explanation, namely, the causal account of the directionality of scientific explanation. University of Chicago Press 2014-07-01 Article PeerReviewed Jansson, Lina (2014) Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 81 (3). pp. 332-348. ISSN 1539-767X http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/676687 doi:10.1086/676687 doi:10.1086/676687 |
| spellingShingle | Jansson, Lina Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| title | Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| title_full | Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| title_fullStr | Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| title_full_unstemmed | Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| title_short | Causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| title_sort | causal theories of explanation and the challenge of explanatory disagreement |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34880/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34880/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34880/ |