Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence

The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notions of ground and ontological dependence. On the ot...

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Main Author: Jansson, Lina
Format: Article
Published: Springer 2016
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34878/
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author Jansson, Lina
author_facet Jansson, Lina
author_sort Jansson, Lina
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notions of ground and ontological dependence. On the other, objections have been raised to the usefulness of adding ground and ontological dependence to the existing store of other metaphysical notions. Even the logical properties of ground and ontological dependence are under debate. In this article, I focus on how to account for the judgements of non-symmetry in several of the cases that motivate the introduction of notions like ground and ontological dependence. By focusing on the notion of explanation relative to a theory, I conclude that we do not need to postulate a distinctively asymmetric metaphysical notion in order to account for these judgements.
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spelling nottingham-348782020-05-04T17:36:01Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34878/ Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence Jansson, Lina The notions of ground and ontological dependence have made a prominent resurgence in much of contemporary metaphysics. However, objections have been raised. On the one hand, objections have been raised to the need for distinctively metaphysical notions of ground and ontological dependence. On the other, objections have been raised to the usefulness of adding ground and ontological dependence to the existing store of other metaphysical notions. Even the logical properties of ground and ontological dependence are under debate. In this article, I focus on how to account for the judgements of non-symmetry in several of the cases that motivate the introduction of notions like ground and ontological dependence. By focusing on the notion of explanation relative to a theory, I conclude that we do not need to postulate a distinctively asymmetric metaphysical notion in order to account for these judgements. Springer 2016-02-22 Article PeerReviewed Jansson, Lina (2016) Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence. Erkenntnis . ISSN 1572-8420 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10670-016-9802-1 doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1 doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9802-1
spellingShingle Jansson, Lina
Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
title Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
title_full Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
title_fullStr Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
title_full_unstemmed Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
title_short Explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
title_sort explanatory asymmetries, ground, and ontological dependence
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34878/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34878/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34878/