Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated

The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing the importance of conditions of application when...

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Main Author: Jansson, Lina
Format: Article
Published: Journal of Philosophy 2015
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34875/
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author Jansson, Lina
author_facet Jansson, Lina
author_sort Jansson, Lina
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing the importance of conditions of application when laws do explanatory work, and I go on to develop a notion of nomological (non-causal) dependence that can tackle the non-symmetry problem. The strategy is to show how a strong notion of counterfactual dependence as guaranteed by the laws is a plausible account of what we aim towards when we give law-based explanations. The aim of this project is not to deny that causal relations can do explanatory work but to restore laws of nature as capable of being explanatory even in the absence of any knowledge of causal underpinnings.
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spelling nottingham-348752020-05-04T17:18:04Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34875/ Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated Jansson, Lina The problem of explanatory non-symmetries provides the strongest reason to abandon the view that laws can figure in explanations without causal underpinnings. I argue that this problem can be overcome. The solution that I propose starts from noticing the importance of conditions of application when laws do explanatory work, and I go on to develop a notion of nomological (non-causal) dependence that can tackle the non-symmetry problem. The strategy is to show how a strong notion of counterfactual dependence as guaranteed by the laws is a plausible account of what we aim towards when we give law-based explanations. The aim of this project is not to deny that causal relations can do explanatory work but to restore laws of nature as capable of being explanatory even in the absence of any knowledge of causal underpinnings. Journal of Philosophy 2015-11-01 Article PeerReviewed Jansson, Lina (2015) Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated. Journal of Philosophy, 112 (11). pp. 577-599. ISSN 1939-8549 https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=jphil&id=jphil_2015_0112_0011_0577_0599 doi:10.5840/jphil20151121138 doi:10.5840/jphil20151121138
spellingShingle Jansson, Lina
Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
title Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
title_full Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
title_fullStr Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
title_full_unstemmed Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
title_short Explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
title_sort explanatory asymmetries: laws of nature rehabilitated
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34875/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34875/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/34875/