Corruption and bicameral reforms

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the...

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Main Authors: Facchini, Giovanni, Testa, Cecilia
Format: Article
Published: Springer 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33776/
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author Facchini, Giovanni
Testa, Cecilia
author_facet Facchini, Giovanni
Testa, Cecilia
author_sort Facchini, Giovanni
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.
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spelling nottingham-337762020-05-04T17:49:53Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33776/ Corruption and bicameral reforms Facchini, Giovanni Testa, Cecilia During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to ‘hard time constraints’, and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers’ bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. Springer 2016-05-27 Article PeerReviewed Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia (2016) Corruption and bicameral reforms. Social Choice and Welfare . pp. 1-25. ISSN 1432-217X Bicameralism corruption lobbying http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-016-0969-9 doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9 doi:10.1007/s00355-016-0969-9
spellingShingle Bicameralism
corruption
lobbying
Facchini, Giovanni
Testa, Cecilia
Corruption and bicameral reforms
title Corruption and bicameral reforms
title_full Corruption and bicameral reforms
title_fullStr Corruption and bicameral reforms
title_full_unstemmed Corruption and bicameral reforms
title_short Corruption and bicameral reforms
title_sort corruption and bicameral reforms
topic Bicameralism
corruption
lobbying
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33776/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33776/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33776/