Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better
Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimon...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
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Oxford University Press
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33739/ |
| _version_ | 1848794693379293184 |
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| author | Jansson, Lina Tallant, Jonathan |
| author_facet | Jansson, Lina Tallant, Jonathan |
| author_sort | Jansson, Lina |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:20:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-33739 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:20:15Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-337392020-05-04T17:36:03Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33739/ Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better Jansson, Lina Tallant, Jonathan Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability and so on, could be the driving ones in the historical cases under consideration. Oxford University Press 2016-02-22 Article PeerReviewed Jansson, Lina and Tallant, Jonathan (2016) Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . ISSN 1464-3537 http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2016/02/22/bjps.axv064 doi:10.1093/bjps/axv064 doi:10.1093/bjps/axv064 |
| spellingShingle | Jansson, Lina Tallant, Jonathan Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| title | Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| title_full | Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| title_fullStr | Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| title_full_unstemmed | Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| title_short | Quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| title_sort | quantitative parsimony: probably for the better |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33739/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33739/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33739/ |