Nefarious presentism

Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions: ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Up...

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Main Authors: Tallant, Jonathan, Ingram, David
Format: Article
Published: Oxford University Press 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33718/
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author Tallant, Jonathan
Ingram, David
author_facet Tallant, Jonathan
Ingram, David
author_sort Tallant, Jonathan
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions: ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.
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spelling nottingham-337182020-05-04T17:09:24Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33718/ Nefarious presentism Tallant, Jonathan Ingram, David Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions: ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists. Oxford University Press 2015-07-01 Article PeerReviewed Tallant, Jonathan and Ingram, David (2015) Nefarious presentism. Philosophical Quarterly, 65 (260). pp. 355-371. ISSN 0031-8094 Presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu095 doi:10.1093/pq/pqu095 doi:10.1093/pq/pqu095
spellingShingle Presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism
Tallant, Jonathan
Ingram, David
Nefarious presentism
title Nefarious presentism
title_full Nefarious presentism
title_fullStr Nefarious presentism
title_full_unstemmed Nefarious presentism
title_short Nefarious presentism
title_sort nefarious presentism
topic Presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33718/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33718/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33718/