Monism: the islands of plurality
Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are merely derivative. Jonathan Schaffer has defended mon...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33716/ |
| _version_ | 1848794688163676160 |
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| author | Baron, Sam Tallant, Jonathan |
| author_facet | Baron, Sam Tallant, Jonathan |
| author_sort | Baron, Sam |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are merely derivative. Jonathan Schaffer has defended monism in its current guise, across a range of papers. Each paper looks to add something to the monistic picture of the world. In this paper we argue that monism—as Schaffer describes it—is false. To do so we develop an ‘island universe’ argument against Schaffer’s monistic theory. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:20:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-33716 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:20:10Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-337162020-05-04T17:41:37Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33716/ Monism: the islands of plurality Baron, Sam Tallant, Jonathan Priority monism (hereafter, ‘monism’) is the view that there exists one fundamental entity—the world—and that all other objects that exist (a set of objects typically taken to include tables, chairs, and the whole menagerie of everyday items) are merely derivative. Jonathan Schaffer has defended monism in its current guise, across a range of papers. Each paper looks to add something to the monistic picture of the world. In this paper we argue that monism—as Schaffer describes it—is false. To do so we develop an ‘island universe’ argument against Schaffer’s monistic theory. Wiley 2016-03-16 Article PeerReviewed Baron, Sam and Tallant, Jonathan (2016) Monism: the islands of plurality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93 (3). pp. 583-606. ISSN 1933-1592 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12270/abstract doi:10.1111/phpr.12270 doi:10.1111/phpr.12270 |
| spellingShingle | Baron, Sam Tallant, Jonathan Monism: the islands of plurality |
| title | Monism: the islands of plurality |
| title_full | Monism: the islands of plurality |
| title_fullStr | Monism: the islands of plurality |
| title_full_unstemmed | Monism: the islands of plurality |
| title_short | Monism: the islands of plurality |
| title_sort | monism: the islands of plurality |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33716/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33716/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33716/ |