On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons
According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-calle...
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33260/ |
| _version_ | 1848794595614261248 |
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| author | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_facet | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_sort | Sinclair, Neil |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams’ claim is compatible with this ‘expansive’ account of what it is to act for a normative reason. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:18:42Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-33260 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:18:42Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-332602020-05-04T17:52:40Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33260/ On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons Sinclair, Neil According to Bernard Williams, if it is true that A has a normative reason to Φ then it must be possible that A should Φ for that reason. This claim is important both because it restricts the range of reasons which agents can have and because it has been used as a premise in an argument for so-called ‘internalist’ theories of reasons. In this paper I rebut an apparent counterexamples to Williams’ claim: Schroeder’s (2007) example of Nate. I argue that this counterexample fails since it underestimates the range of cases where agents can act for their normative reasons. Moreover, I argue that a key motivation behind Williams’ claim is compatible with this ‘expansive’ account of what it is to act for a normative reason. Springer 2016-05-08 Article PeerReviewed Sinclair, Neil (2016) On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19 (5). pp. 1211-1223. ISSN 1572-8447 Action; normative reason; practical deliberation; reasons internalism; Schroeder Williams http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8 doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8 doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9731-8 |
| spellingShingle | Action; normative reason; practical deliberation; reasons internalism; Schroeder Williams Sinclair, Neil On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| title | On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| title_full | On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| title_fullStr | On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| title_short | On the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| title_sort | on the connection between normative reasons and the possibility of acting for those reasons |
| topic | Action; normative reason; practical deliberation; reasons internalism; Schroeder Williams |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33260/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33260/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33260/ |