Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational
Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? Research on moral dilemmas in psychology, experimental philosophy, and neuropsychology has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral actions (footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equivalent utilit...
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33166/ |
| _version_ | 1848794573870989312 |
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| author | Kusev, Petko van Schaik, Paul Alzahrani, Shrooq Lonigro, Samantha Purser, Harry |
| author_facet | Kusev, Petko van Schaik, Paul Alzahrani, Shrooq Lonigro, Samantha Purser, Harry |
| author_sort | Kusev, Petko |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? Research on moral dilemmas in psychology, experimental philosophy, and neuropsychology has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral actions (footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equivalent utilitarian impersonal moral actions (trolley dilemma). Accordingly, theorists (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) have argued that judgments of appropriateness in personal moral dilemmas are more emotionally salient and cognitively demanding (taking more time to be rational) than impersonal moral dilemmas. Our novel findings show an effect of psychological accessibility (driven by partial contextual information; Kahneman, 2003) on utilitarian moral behavior and response time for rational choices. Enhanced accessibility of utilitarian outcomes through comprehensive information about moral actions and consequences boosted utility maximization in moral choices, with rational choices taking less time. Moreover, our result suggests that previous results indicating emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, may have been artifacts of presenting partial information. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:18:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-33166 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:18:21Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-331662020-05-04T17:44:51Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33166/ Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational Kusev, Petko van Schaik, Paul Alzahrani, Shrooq Lonigro, Samantha Purser, Harry Is it acceptable and moral to sacrifice a few people’s lives to save many others? Research on moral dilemmas in psychology, experimental philosophy, and neuropsychology has shown that respondents judge utilitarian personal moral actions (footbridge dilemma) as less appropriate than equivalent utilitarian impersonal moral actions (trolley dilemma). Accordingly, theorists (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) have argued that judgments of appropriateness in personal moral dilemmas are more emotionally salient and cognitively demanding (taking more time to be rational) than impersonal moral dilemmas. Our novel findings show an effect of psychological accessibility (driven by partial contextual information; Kahneman, 2003) on utilitarian moral behavior and response time for rational choices. Enhanced accessibility of utilitarian outcomes through comprehensive information about moral actions and consequences boosted utility maximization in moral choices, with rational choices taking less time. Moreover, our result suggests that previous results indicating emotional interference, with rational choices taking more time to make, may have been artifacts of presenting partial information. Springer 2016-04-27 Article PeerReviewed Kusev, Petko, van Schaik, Paul, Alzahrani, Shrooq, Lonigro, Samantha and Purser, Harry (2016) Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review . ISSN 1069-9384 Utility; moral dilemmas; accessibility; judgments; rational choice http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1029-2 doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1029-2 doi:10.3758/s13423-016-1029-2 |
| spellingShingle | Utility; moral dilemmas; accessibility; judgments; rational choice Kusev, Petko van Schaik, Paul Alzahrani, Shrooq Lonigro, Samantha Purser, Harry Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| title | Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| title_full | Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| title_fullStr | Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| title_full_unstemmed | Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| title_short | Judging the morality of utilitarian actions: How poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| title_sort | judging the morality of utilitarian actions: how poor utilitarian accessibility makes judges irrational |
| topic | Utility; moral dilemmas; accessibility; judgments; rational choice |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33166/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33166/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33166/ |