Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting ru...
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier
2017
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33085/ |
| _version_ | 1848794554099040256 |
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| author | Anesi, Vincent Duggan, John |
| author_facet | Anesi, Vincent Duggan, John |
| author_sort | Anesi, Vincent |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:18:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-33085 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:18:02Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-330852020-05-04T19:57:19Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33085/ Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players Anesi, Vincent Duggan, John This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of Diermeier and Fong (2012). We show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira. Elsevier 2017-05 Article PeerReviewed Anesi, Vincent and Duggan, John (2017) Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players. Games and Economic Behavior, 103 . pp. 30-40. ISSN 0899-8256 Bargaining; Endogenous status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium; Von Neumann–Morgenstern solution http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825616300252 doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010 doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.010 |
| spellingShingle | Bargaining; Endogenous status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium; Von Neumann–Morgenstern solution Anesi, Vincent Duggan, John Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| title | Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| title_full | Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| title_fullStr | Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| title_short | Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| title_sort | dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players |
| topic | Bargaining; Endogenous status quo; Markov perfect equilibrium; Von Neumann–Morgenstern solution |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33085/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33085/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33085/ |