Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32514/ |
| _version_ | 1848794426539769856 |
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| author | Matros, Alexander Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_facet | Matros, Alexander Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_sort | Matros, Alexander |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:16:00Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-32514 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:16:00Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-325142020-05-04T17:43:46Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32514/ Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting Matros, Alexander Possajennikov, Alex We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions. Elsevier 2016-05-01 Article PeerReviewed Matros, Alexander and Possajennikov, Alex (2016) Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting. Economics Letters, 142 . pp. 74-77. ISSN 0165-1765 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003 doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003 |
| spellingShingle | Matros, Alexander Possajennikov, Alex Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| title | Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| title_full | Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| title_fullStr | Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| title_short | Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| title_sort | tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32514/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32514/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/32514/ |