In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism
In this thesis I present a challenge to anyone who continues to engage in moral thinking – that is to say, I present a challenge to most people currently alive. In the first three chapters, I defend the idea that no non-negative moral proposition is ever true ('Moral Error Theory'). On the...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2016
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/31237/ |
| _version_ | 1848794156972900352 |
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| author | Dimmock, Mark |
| author_facet | Dimmock, Mark |
| author_sort | Dimmock, Mark |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In this thesis I present a challenge to anyone who continues to engage in moral thinking – that is to say, I present a challenge to most people currently alive. In the first three chapters, I defend the idea that no non-negative moral proposition is ever true ('Moral Error Theory'). On the back of this defence, I then provide arguments in support of the related - but not entailed – Moral Abolitionist account. According to this view, moral thought, moral talk and morally-coloured motivations should be abolished in favour of an entirely non-moral assessment of the world and the options that face us when we deliberate on questions regarding to ‘how to act’ or ‘how to live’. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:11:43Z |
| format | Thesis (University of Nottingham only) |
| id | nottingham-31237 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:11:43Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-312372025-02-28T13:22:41Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/31237/ In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism Dimmock, Mark In this thesis I present a challenge to anyone who continues to engage in moral thinking – that is to say, I present a challenge to most people currently alive. In the first three chapters, I defend the idea that no non-negative moral proposition is ever true ('Moral Error Theory'). On the back of this defence, I then provide arguments in support of the related - but not entailed – Moral Abolitionist account. According to this view, moral thought, moral talk and morally-coloured motivations should be abolished in favour of an entirely non-moral assessment of the world and the options that face us when we deliberate on questions regarding to ‘how to act’ or ‘how to live’. 2016-07-12 Thesis (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en arr https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/31237/1/MarkDimmockCorrectedThesis.pdf Dimmock, Mark (2016) In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism. PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. Morality Error Theory Moral Abolitionism Moral Error Theory |
| spellingShingle | Morality Error Theory Moral Abolitionism Moral Error Theory Dimmock, Mark In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| title | In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| title_full | In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| title_fullStr | In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| title_full_unstemmed | In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| title_short | In defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| title_sort | in defence of moral error theory and moral abolitionism |
| topic | Morality Error Theory Moral Abolitionism Moral Error Theory |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/31237/ |