Explaining moral knowledge
In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a...
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| Format: | Article |
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Brill
2014
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30942/ |
| _version_ | 1848794095599747072 |
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| author | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| author_facet | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| author_sort | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:10:45Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-30942 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:10:45Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Brill |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-309422020-05-04T20:17:06Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30942/ Explaining moral knowledge Leibowitz, Uri D. In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that when we are careful to keep separate the various explanatory tasks at hand we can see that a particularist-friendly explanation of the fact that (e.g.,) Jane knows that A is morally right might not be so difficult to come by. Moreover, I suggest that a particularist approach to explaining knowledge of particular moral facts may go some way towards discharging the challenge of moral scepticism. Brill 2014 Article PeerReviewed Leibowitz, Uri D. (2014) Explaining moral knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 11 (1). pp. 35-56. ISSN 1745-5243 particularism – generalism – principles – moral knowledge – moral epistemology http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-4681012 doi:10.1163/17455243-4681012 doi:10.1163/17455243-4681012 |
| spellingShingle | particularism – generalism – principles – moral knowledge – moral epistemology Leibowitz, Uri D. Explaining moral knowledge |
| title | Explaining moral knowledge |
| title_full | Explaining moral knowledge |
| title_fullStr | Explaining moral knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed | Explaining moral knowledge |
| title_short | Explaining moral knowledge |
| title_sort | explaining moral knowledge |
| topic | particularism – generalism – principles – moral knowledge – moral epistemology |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30942/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30942/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30942/ |