Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies
Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasp...
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| Format: | Article |
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Brill
2015
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30918/ |
| _version_ | 1848794090399858688 |
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| author | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| author_facet | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| author_sort | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ad hominem reply” to students’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness/unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:10:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-30918 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:10:40Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Brill |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-309182020-05-04T20:07:00Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30918/ Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies Leibowitz, Uri D. Many of us read Peter Singer’s work on our obligations to those in desperate need with our students. Famously, Singer argues that we have a moral obligation to give a significant portion of our assets to famine relief. If my own experience is not atypical, it is quite common for students, upon grasping the implications of Singer’s argument, to ask whether Singer gives to famine relief. In response it might be tempting to remind students of the (so called) ad hominem fallacy of attacking the person advancing an argument rather than the argument itself. In this paper I argue that the “ad hominem reply” to students’ request for information about Singer is misguided. First I show that biographical facts about the person advancing an argument can constitute indirect evidence for the soundness/unsoundness of the argument. Second, I argue that such facts are relevant because they may reveal that one can discard the argument without thereby incurring moral responsibility for failing to act on its conclusion even if the argument is sound. Brill 2015-10 Article PeerReviewed Leibowitz, Uri D. (2015) Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies. Journal of Moral Philosophy . ISSN 1745-5243 (In Press) Ad hominem; Moral deliberation; Fallacies; Moral reasoning; Critical reasoning; Moral rationality http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/17455243-46810045 doi:10.1163/17455243-46810045 doi:10.1163/17455243-46810045 |
| spellingShingle | Ad hominem; Moral deliberation; Fallacies; Moral reasoning; Critical reasoning; Moral rationality Leibowitz, Uri D. Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| title | Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| title_full | Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| title_fullStr | Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| title_short | Moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| title_sort | moral deliberation and ad hominem fallacies |
| topic | Ad hominem; Moral deliberation; Fallacies; Moral reasoning; Critical reasoning; Moral rationality |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30918/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30918/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30918/ |