The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control
We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring m...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press
2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30497/ |
| _version_ | 1848793997267435520 |
|---|---|
| author | Facchini, Giovanni Testa, Cecilia |
| author_facet | Facchini, Giovanni Testa, Cecilia |
| author_sort | Facchini, Giovanni |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploy- ing inadequate resources on cost–effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one in- strument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re–election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less a effective enforcement tool, such as border control. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:09:11Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-30497 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:09:11Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-304972020-05-04T17:04:54Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30497/ The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control Facchini, Giovanni Testa, Cecilia We study migration policy enforcement by an elected government. The policy-maker faces uncertainty on the supply of migrants, but has more information than the public on its preferences and the extent and effectiveness of its enforcement activities. We show that a utilitarian government preferring more migrants than the majority may find it optimal to set a restrictive target to please the median voter, while relaxing its enforcement to admit more foreigners in a concealed way. Lax enforcement may be achieved either by deploy- ing inadequate resources on cost–effective activities (domestic enforcement) or by allocating a larger budget on less effective tools (border enforcement). The attractiveness of one in- strument over the other depends on the size of the immigrant flow: if the supply is large, border enforcement might be preferred because, although more costly, it brings the number of migrants closer to the utilitarian optimum. Hence, re–election concerns might provide a rationale for the widespread use of less a effective enforcement tool, such as border control. Oxford University Press 2015-03-07 Article PeerReviewed Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia (2015) The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control. CESifo Economic Studies, 61 (3-4). pp. 701-721. ISSN 1612-7501 illegal immigration immigration policy http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/content/61/3-4/701.full doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifv005 doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifv005 |
| spellingShingle | illegal immigration immigration policy Facchini, Giovanni Testa, Cecilia The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| title | The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| title_full | The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| title_fullStr | The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| title_full_unstemmed | The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| title_short | The political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| title_sort | political economy of migration enforcement: domestic versus border control |
| topic | illegal immigration immigration policy |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30497/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30497/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/30497/ |