Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective
Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equi...
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Elsevier
2015
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29535/ |
| _version_ | 1848793806158168064 |
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| author | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_facet | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_sort | Possajennikov, Alex |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:06:09Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-29535 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:06:09Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-295352020-05-04T17:15:37Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29535/ Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective Possajennikov, Alex Suppose that in symmetric aggregative games, in which payoffs depend only on a player's strategy and on an aggregate of all players' strategies, players have conjectures about the reaction of the aggregate to marginal changes in their strategy. The players play a conjectural variation equilibrium, which determines their fitness payoffs. The paper shows that only consistent conjectures can be evolutionarily stable in an infinite population, where a conjecture is consistent if it is equal to the marginal change in the aggregate determined by the actual best responses. In the finite population case, only zero conjectures representing aggregate-taking behavior can be evolutionarily stable. Elsevier 2015-08-06 Article PeerReviewed Possajennikov, Alex (2015) Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective. Mathematical Social Sciences, 77 . pp. 55-61. ISSN 0165-4896 conjectural variations aggregative games indirect evolution evolutionary stability http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489615000670 doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.07.003 doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.07.003 |
| spellingShingle | conjectural variations aggregative games indirect evolution evolutionary stability Possajennikov, Alex Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| title | Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_full | Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_fullStr | Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_short | Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| title_sort | conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective |
| topic | conjectural variations aggregative games indirect evolution evolutionary stability |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29535/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29535/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/29535/ |