Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania
It has been argued that accountability is a public good that only citizens can provide. Governments can put institutions in place that allow citizens to hold public servants to account, but citizens must participate in those institutions if accountability is to be achieved. Thus, citizens face a soc...
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier
2014
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28316/ |
| _version_ | 1848793551794601984 |
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| author | Barr, Abigail Packard, Truman Serra, Danila |
| author_facet | Barr, Abigail Packard, Truman Serra, Danila |
| author_sort | Barr, Abigail |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | It has been argued that accountability is a public good that only citizens can provide. Governments can put institutions in place that allow citizens to hold public servants to account, but citizens must participate in those institutions if accountability is to be achieved. Thus, citizens face a social dilemma — participate in holding public servants to account at a cost in terms of time and effort or free ride, i.e. do not participate, while benefiting from the efforts of those who do. If this characterization of accountability is valid, we would expect more cooperatively inclined citizens to participate in account¬ ability institutions, while the less cooperatively inclined do not. We test the validity of this characterization by investigating the correlation between individual behavior in a simple public goods game and their participation in local and national accountability institutions in Albania. We involve a nationally representative sample of 1800 adults with children in primary school. We find significant correlations between cooperativeness and participa¬ tion in school accountability institutions and national elections, both at the individual level and the district level. These correlations are robust to the introduction of many controls in the analysis and, in the case of national elections, to the use of official election turn-out statistics in place of self-reported turn-out. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:02:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-28316 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T19:02:06Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-283162020-05-04T20:14:31Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28316/ Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania Barr, Abigail Packard, Truman Serra, Danila It has been argued that accountability is a public good that only citizens can provide. Governments can put institutions in place that allow citizens to hold public servants to account, but citizens must participate in those institutions if accountability is to be achieved. Thus, citizens face a social dilemma — participate in holding public servants to account at a cost in terms of time and effort or free ride, i.e. do not participate, while benefiting from the efforts of those who do. If this characterization of accountability is valid, we would expect more cooperatively inclined citizens to participate in account¬ ability institutions, while the less cooperatively inclined do not. We test the validity of this characterization by investigating the correlation between individual behavior in a simple public goods game and their participation in local and national accountability institutions in Albania. We involve a nationally representative sample of 1800 adults with children in primary school. We find significant correlations between cooperativeness and participa¬ tion in school accountability institutions and national elections, both at the individual level and the district level. These correlations are robust to the introduction of many controls in the analysis and, in the case of national elections, to the use of official election turn-out statistics in place of self-reported turn-out. Elsevier 2014-05 Article PeerReviewed Barr, Abigail, Packard, Truman and Serra, Danila (2014) Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania. European Economic Review, 68 . pp. 250-269. ISSN 0014-2921 Accountability; Participation; Elections; Collective action; Public good games http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292114000129 doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.010 doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.010 |
| spellingShingle | Accountability; Participation; Elections; Collective action; Public good games Barr, Abigail Packard, Truman Serra, Danila Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania |
| title | Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania |
| title_full | Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania |
| title_fullStr | Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania |
| title_full_unstemmed | Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania |
| title_short | Participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from Albania |
| title_sort | participatory accountability and collective action: experimental evidence from albania |
| topic | Accountability; Participation; Elections; Collective action; Public good games |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28316/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28316/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/28316/ |