Executive Remuneration in Retrospect

The focus and purpose of this paper is to document the advancement and development of executive remuneration over the past thirty years. It attempts to provide a useful contribution towards the field of executive remuneration by producing a synthesis of the developments and academic endeavor that ha...

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Main Author: Rahim, Hifza
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2013
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/26570/
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author Rahim, Hifza
author_facet Rahim, Hifza
author_sort Rahim, Hifza
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description The focus and purpose of this paper is to document the advancement and development of executive remuneration over the past thirty years. It attempts to provide a useful contribution towards the field of executive remuneration by producing a synthesis of the developments and academic endeavor that has occurred from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Agency problems arise when ownership and control are separated and the owners are unable to perfectly observe the actions of the manager (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). As a result, executive pay packages are designed to provide the correct level of incentives to mitigate the creation of agency costs. From a theoretical perspective, an efficient pay package should eliminate agency costs. However, in practice it has been found that incentives are often misaligned leading to the gains of executives’ personal wealth at the expense of the shareholders’ wealth. Thus, agency costs and its elimination is an important focus of this paper. At the same time, it also documents the change and development of executive remuneration in the real world, outside the theoretical frameworks, where more often than not, it has been found to be inefficient. Therefore, through a timeline of executive pay over the last thirty years, this paper seeks to explore and analyse the root causes of agency costs and the failure of executive remuneration.
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spelling nottingham-265702017-12-19T11:43:48Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/26570/ Executive Remuneration in Retrospect Rahim, Hifza The focus and purpose of this paper is to document the advancement and development of executive remuneration over the past thirty years. It attempts to provide a useful contribution towards the field of executive remuneration by producing a synthesis of the developments and academic endeavor that has occurred from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Agency problems arise when ownership and control are separated and the owners are unable to perfectly observe the actions of the manager (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). As a result, executive pay packages are designed to provide the correct level of incentives to mitigate the creation of agency costs. From a theoretical perspective, an efficient pay package should eliminate agency costs. However, in practice it has been found that incentives are often misaligned leading to the gains of executives’ personal wealth at the expense of the shareholders’ wealth. Thus, agency costs and its elimination is an important focus of this paper. At the same time, it also documents the change and development of executive remuneration in the real world, outside the theoretical frameworks, where more often than not, it has been found to be inefficient. Therefore, through a timeline of executive pay over the last thirty years, this paper seeks to explore and analyse the root causes of agency costs and the failure of executive remuneration. 2013-09-18 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/26570/1/Dissertation2013_HifzaRahim.pdf Rahim, Hifza (2013) Executive Remuneration in Retrospect. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished)
spellingShingle Rahim, Hifza
Executive Remuneration in Retrospect
title Executive Remuneration in Retrospect
title_full Executive Remuneration in Retrospect
title_fullStr Executive Remuneration in Retrospect
title_full_unstemmed Executive Remuneration in Retrospect
title_short Executive Remuneration in Retrospect
title_sort executive remuneration in retrospect
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/26570/