Dubious by nature
There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there...
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| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis
2013
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/2392/ |
| _version_ | 1848790773397454848 |
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| author | Tallant, Jonathan |
| author_facet | Tallant, Jonathan |
| author_sort | Tallant, Jonathan |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelow's (1996) Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial defense of Lucretianism. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:17:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-2392 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:17:56Z |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publisher | Taylor & Francis |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-23922020-05-04T16:37:59Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/2392/ Dubious by nature Tallant, Jonathan There is a charge sometimes made in metaphysics that particular commitments are ‘hypothetical’, ‘dubious’ or ‘suspicious’. There have been two analyses given of what this consists in—due to Crisp (2007) and Cameron (2011). The aim of this paper is to reject both analyses and thereby show that there is no obvious way to press the objection against said commitments that they are ‘dubious’ and objectionable. Later in the paper I consider another account of what it might be to be ‘dubious’, and argue that this too fails. I use Bigelow's (1996) Lucretian properties as a vehicle for the discussions of dubiousness that follow. As a consequence, the paper ends up offering a partial defense of Lucretianism. Taylor & Francis 2013-07-16 Article PeerReviewed Tallant, Jonathan (2013) Dubious by nature. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43 (1). pp. 97-116. ISSN 0045-5091 Presentism Lucretianism Hypothetical properties Dubious properties Suspicious properties Point beyond http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.2013.812372#.UyTYOFF_sb0 doi:10.1080/00455091.2013.812372 doi:10.1080/00455091.2013.812372 |
| spellingShingle | Presentism Lucretianism Hypothetical properties Dubious properties Suspicious properties Point beyond Tallant, Jonathan Dubious by nature |
| title | Dubious by nature |
| title_full | Dubious by nature |
| title_fullStr | Dubious by nature |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dubious by nature |
| title_short | Dubious by nature |
| title_sort | dubious by nature |
| topic | Presentism Lucretianism Hypothetical properties Dubious properties Suspicious properties Point beyond |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/2392/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/2392/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/2392/ |