Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK

Public authority, the media and academic researchers have expressed concern over the price discounting behavior followed by an initial auditor change. This audit low balling effect is significant since it is criticized as a threat to auditor independence. This study investigates the impact of audito...

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Main Author: Li, Ye
Format: Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)
Language:English
Published: 2009
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23160/
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author Li, Ye
author_facet Li, Ye
author_sort Li, Ye
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Public authority, the media and academic researchers have expressed concern over the price discounting behavior followed by an initial auditor change. This audit low balling effect is significant since it is criticized as a threat to auditor independence. This study investigates the impact of auditor change in audit fees, and to determine whether the low balling behavior takes place in the UK audit market. Tests are conducted for a sample of 250 public listed companies selected from London Stock Exchange FTSE 350 index over the period 2004-2008. The results suggest here is a positive association between auditor change in the short term and audit pricing, and this positive relationship appears to persist for auditor change in the longer term with increasing level of audit fee. Therefore, this study concludes that low balling behavior is not observed for at least a part of UK audit market.
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institution University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus
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spelling nottingham-231602017-12-29T02:41:33Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23160/ Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK Li, Ye Public authority, the media and academic researchers have expressed concern over the price discounting behavior followed by an initial auditor change. This audit low balling effect is significant since it is criticized as a threat to auditor independence. This study investigates the impact of auditor change in audit fees, and to determine whether the low balling behavior takes place in the UK audit market. Tests are conducted for a sample of 250 public listed companies selected from London Stock Exchange FTSE 350 index over the period 2004-2008. The results suggest here is a positive association between auditor change in the short term and audit pricing, and this positive relationship appears to persist for auditor change in the longer term with increasing level of audit fee. Therefore, this study concludes that low balling behavior is not observed for at least a part of UK audit market. 2009-09-24 Dissertation (University of Nottingham only) NonPeerReviewed application/pdf en https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23160/1/final2309.pdf Li, Ye (2009) Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK. [Dissertation (University of Nottingham only)] (Unpublished)
spellingShingle Li, Ye
Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK
title Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK
title_full Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK
title_fullStr Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK
title_full_unstemmed Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK
title_short Auditing Pricing and Auditor Change: an Investigation of Low-balling Effect in the UK
title_sort auditing pricing and auditor change: an investigation of low-balling effect in the uk
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/23160/