Commitment in symmetric contests
The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does n...
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| Format: | Article |
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Economics Bulletin
2009
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1999/ |
| _version_ | 1848790701808025600 |
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| author | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_facet | Possajennikov, Alex |
| author_sort | Possajennikov, Alex |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a
particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:16:48Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-1999 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:16:48Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Economics Bulletin |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-19992020-05-04T20:26:58Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1999/ Commitment in symmetric contests Possajennikov, Alex The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players. Economics Bulletin 2009 Article PeerReviewed Possajennikov, Alex (2009) Commitment in symmetric contests. Economics Bulletin, 29 (1). pp. 376-384. ISSN 1545-2921 http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I1-P39.pdf |
| spellingShingle | Possajennikov, Alex Commitment in symmetric contests |
| title | Commitment in symmetric contests |
| title_full | Commitment in symmetric contests |
| title_fullStr | Commitment in symmetric contests |
| title_full_unstemmed | Commitment in symmetric contests |
| title_short | Commitment in symmetric contests |
| title_sort | commitment in symmetric contests |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1999/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1999/ |