Responsibility for implicit bias

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the contro...

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Main Author: Holroyd, Jules
Format: Article
Published: Wiley 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1932/
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author Holroyd, Jules
author_facet Holroyd, Jules
author_sort Holroyd, Jules
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are (sometimes) liable to blame could be constructive.
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spelling nottingham-19322020-05-04T20:21:22Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1932/ Responsibility for implicit bias Holroyd, Jules Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are (sometimes) liable to blame could be constructive. Wiley 2012-09 Article NonPeerReviewed Holroyd, Jules (2012) Responsibility for implicit bias. Journal of Social Philosophy, 43 (3). pp. 274-306. ISSN 1467-9833 Implicit bias responsibility moral psychology http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01565.x/abstract doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01565.x doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2012.01565.x
spellingShingle Implicit bias
responsibility
moral psychology
Holroyd, Jules
Responsibility for implicit bias
title Responsibility for implicit bias
title_full Responsibility for implicit bias
title_fullStr Responsibility for implicit bias
title_full_unstemmed Responsibility for implicit bias
title_short Responsibility for implicit bias
title_sort responsibility for implicit bias
topic Implicit bias
responsibility
moral psychology
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1932/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1932/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1932/