Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements

This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion that such judgements have both descriptive (belief...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sinclair, Neil
Format: Article
Published: Springer 2012
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1608/
_version_ 1848790637619445760
author Sinclair, Neil
author_facet Sinclair, Neil
author_sort Sinclair, Neil
building Nottingham Research Data Repository
collection Online Access
description This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion that such judgements have both descriptive (belief-like) and directive (desire-like) content, intimately entwined. This conclusion directly validates neither descriptivism nor expressivism, but the application of teleosemantics to moral content does leave the descriptivist with explanatory challenges which the expressivist does not face. Since teleosemantics ties content to function, the paper also offers an account of the evolutionary function of moral judgements.
first_indexed 2025-11-14T18:15:47Z
format Article
id nottingham-1608
institution University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus
institution_category Local University
last_indexed 2025-11-14T18:15:47Z
publishDate 2012
publisher Springer
recordtype eprints
repository_type Digital Repository
spelling nottingham-16082020-05-04T16:33:00Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1608/ Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements Sinclair, Neil This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion that such judgements have both descriptive (belief-like) and directive (desire-like) content, intimately entwined. This conclusion directly validates neither descriptivism nor expressivism, but the application of teleosemantics to moral content does leave the descriptivist with explanatory challenges which the expressivist does not face. Since teleosemantics ties content to function, the paper also offers an account of the evolutionary function of moral judgements. Springer 2012-04-03 Article PeerReviewed Sinclair, Neil (2012) Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements. Biology and Philosophy . ISSN 0169-3867 http://www.springerlink.com/content/f5600uu426458r50/ 10.1007/s10539-012-9316-4 10.1007/s10539-012-9316-4 10.1007/s10539-012-9316-4
spellingShingle Sinclair, Neil
Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
title Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
title_full Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
title_fullStr Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
title_full_unstemmed Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
title_short Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
title_sort metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1608/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1608/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1608/