Two kinds of naturalism in ethics

What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential a...

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Main Author: Sinclair, Neil
Format: Article
Published: Springer 2006
Online Access:https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/
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author Sinclair, Neil
author_facet Sinclair, Neil
author_sort Sinclair, Neil
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description What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition.
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spelling nottingham-15992020-05-04T20:30:16Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/ Two kinds of naturalism in ethics Sinclair, Neil What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition. Springer 2006 Article PeerReviewed Sinclair, Neil (2006) Two kinds of naturalism in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9 (4). pp. 417-439. ISSN 1386-2820 http://www.springerlink.com/content/887678048jm3uwl3/ doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7 doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7
spellingShingle Sinclair, Neil
Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
title Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
title_full Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
title_fullStr Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
title_full_unstemmed Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
title_short Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
title_sort two kinds of naturalism in ethics
url https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/
https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/