Two kinds of naturalism in ethics
What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential a...
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer
2006
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/ |
| _version_ | 1848790636248956928 |
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| author | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_facet | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_sort | Sinclair, Neil |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:46Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-1599 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:46Z |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publisher | Springer |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-15992020-05-04T20:30:16Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/ Two kinds of naturalism in ethics Sinclair, Neil What are the conditions on a successful naturalistic account of moral properties? In this paper I discuss one such condition: the possibility of moral concepts playing a role in good empirical theories on a par with those of the natural and social sciences. I argue that Peter Railton’s influential account of moral rightness fails to meet this condition, and thus is only viable in the hands of a naturalist who doesn’t insist on it. This conclusion generalises to all versions of naturalism that give a significant role to a dispositional characterisation of moral properties. I also argue, however, that the epistemological and semantic motivations behind naturalism are consistent with a version of naturalism that abandons the condition. Springer 2006 Article PeerReviewed Sinclair, Neil (2006) Two kinds of naturalism in ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9 (4). pp. 417-439. ISSN 1386-2820 http://www.springerlink.com/content/887678048jm3uwl3/ doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7 doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9017-7 |
| spellingShingle | Sinclair, Neil Two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| title | Two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| title_full | Two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| title_fullStr | Two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| title_full_unstemmed | Two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| title_short | Two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| title_sort | two kinds of naturalism in ethics |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1599/ |