Free thinking for expressivists
This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essentia...
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| Format: | Article |
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2008
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1598/ |
| _version_ | 1848790635981570048 |
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| author | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_facet | Sinclair, Neil |
| author_sort | Sinclair, Neil |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essential co-ordinating role of moral judgement. I also argue that an ‘external reading’ is available for an ‘essentialist’ type of mind-independence claim recently identified by Jenkins. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:45Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-1598 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:45Z |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-15982020-05-04T20:27:55Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1598/ Free thinking for expressivists Sinclair, Neil This paper replies to Zangwill’s argument that quasi-realists cannot accommodate the conceptual status of claims of moral mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. I argue that this conceptual status is compatible with an ‘internal reading’ of such claims once one recognises the essential co-ordinating role of moral judgement. I also argue that an ‘external reading’ is available for an ‘essentialist’ type of mind-independence claim recently identified by Jenkins. 2008 Article NonPeerReviewed Sinclair, Neil (2008) Free thinking for expressivists. Philosophical Papers, 37 (2). pp. 263-287. ISSN 0556-8641 http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rppa20/37/2 doi:10.1080/05568640809485222 doi:10.1080/05568640809485222 |
| spellingShingle | Sinclair, Neil Free thinking for expressivists |
| title | Free thinking for expressivists |
| title_full | Free thinking for expressivists |
| title_fullStr | Free thinking for expressivists |
| title_full_unstemmed | Free thinking for expressivists |
| title_short | Free thinking for expressivists |
| title_sort | free thinking for expressivists |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1598/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1598/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1598/ |