Scientific explanation and moral explanation
Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to co...
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| Format: | Article |
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2011
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| Online Access: | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1542/ |
| _version_ | 1848790626769829888 |
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| author | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| author_facet | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| author_sort | Leibowitz, Uri D. |
| building | Nottingham Research Data Repository |
| collection | Online Access |
| description | Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles. |
| first_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | nottingham-1542 |
| institution | University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus |
| institution_category | Local University |
| last_indexed | 2025-11-14T18:15:37Z |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| recordtype | eprints |
| repository_type | Digital Repository |
| spelling | nottingham-15422020-05-04T20:23:58Z https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1542/ Scientific explanation and moral explanation Leibowitz, Uri D. Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one’s views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non-deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles. 2011 Article PeerReviewed Leibowitz, Uri D. (2011) Scientific explanation and moral explanation. Noûs, 45 (3). pp. 472-503. ISSN 0029-4624 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00775.x/abstract doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00775.x doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00775.x |
| spellingShingle | Leibowitz, Uri D. Scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| title | Scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| title_full | Scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| title_fullStr | Scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| title_short | Scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| title_sort | scientific explanation and moral explanation |
| url | https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1542/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1542/ https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1542/ |